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This Special Issue is composed of papers that start from different theoretical points of 
view and yet share a critical approach to the conceptual foundations of standard1 
environmental economics and policy.  Do their Authors agree in considering their work 
as a contribution to “heterodox environmental economics”?  I do not know. I only know 
that they kindly accepted to submit a paper to a Special Issue about this subject. 
Heterodox environmental economics is mainly based on non-mainstream economic 
theories; in particular it refers to two classic strands of economics (and to their recent 
revival and cross-fertilization): institutional economics and Schumpeterian economics. 
Heterodox environmental economics is therefore part of the economic discipline and it 
does not have the ambition – as is the case of ecological economics – to bring a 
“common perspective that 'transcend' those that are standard in the two disciplines 
[economics and ecology]” (Stagl and Commons, 2005, p. 5).  At the same time – and 
unlike mainstream environmental economics – heterodox environmental economics 
benefits largely from results coming from other social disciplines and from natural 
sciences.  This is why some of the contributors to this Special Issue are economists and 
some others are not. 
This introduction is mainly aimed at trying to answer to the following questions.  Has 
heterodox environmental economics already become a paradigm?  Is it possible to find a 
coherent set of theoretical concepts upon which such a paradigm is founded?  Does a 
 
1 Standard, mainstream and orthodox are used here as synonymous attributes of economics. 
 community of researchers who share a heuristic and problem-solving approach exist? 
Or should we conclude that heterodox environmental economics is still nothing but an 
intersection between different disciplines or, at best, a bunch of theoretical strands 
making use of common concepts and visions ?  
Before answering, we will analyse the distinctive features of orthodox environmental 
economics; then we will briefly show how non-mainstream economics deals with 
environmental matters.  
 
1. Orthodox environmental economics is market-centred and static 
 
Orthodox environmental economics considers the environment as a major source of 
market failures, both because most environmental resources should be considered as 
public or common goods and because most economic activities generate negative 
environmental externalities.  After Coase's seminal theoretical work one should add 
another cause of market failures: environmental externalities are often generated by the 
missing or inadequate attribution of property rights on environmental resources.  
Whether it proposes green taxes, marketable emission permits or new environmental 
markets  – the only aim of orthodox environmental policy is to restore the market 
functioning by removing those imperfections (Baumol and Oates, 1988).  This means 
that the spontaneous interaction of selfish individuals offering and demanding goods 
and services is implicitly considered by orthodox environmental economics as the 
optimum economic and environmental mechanism.  In other words: orthodox 
environmental economics is market-centred.  
Deepening the analysis of orthodox environmental economics, another relevant feature 
appears.  Economic incentives – both those spontaneously emerging from the market 
and those artificially induced by environmental policy – stimulate economic agents, not 
 only to establish the optimum level of their activities, but also to adopt the technology 
which maximizes net economic and environmental benefits.  But this is possible only if 
all economic agents are perfectly informed about technological alternatives that are 
already developed and ready to be adopted.  In such a vision innovation becomes 
nothing but the search for economic and environmental efficiency: technological 
expectations are always confirmed ex-post and there is no room for strong uncertainty; 
more exactly, technology is exogenous and the market is always in equilibrium 
(Amendola and Gaffard, 1988). 
The equilibrium approach is strengthened by the way orthodox environmental 
economics deals with institutions and preferences: consistently with neoclassical 
economics, both are exogenous too.  Environmentally relevant changes in institutions 
and preferences do not come out of the market: they are the result of processes that are 
not considered into the analysis.  Things seem to change when orthodox environmental 
economics meets new institutional economics.  Starting from Williamson's re-
discovering of seminal contributions from Coase, institutions are no longer completely 
exogenous: they depend both on exogenous variables (such as individual preferences 
and power relationships) and on market-derived transaction costs.  Thus, even after this 
last theoretical update, orthodox environmental economics remains market-centred and 
static. 
 
2. Non-mainstream economics and the environment 
 
The market-centred and static approach of orthodox environmental economics has been 
criticized by non-mainstream economics, in particular by institutional economics and 
evolutionary theories of innovation. 
 
                                                 
 
 
2.1. Institutional economics and the environment 
 
Institutional economics2 dates back to Veblen's and Commons' contributions and it is 
today experiencing a revival, mainly due to North's studies (Vanderberg, 2002).  In this 
theoretical approach, studying the processes of institutional conservation, innovation 
and change is crucial to understanding the functioning of the economy.  Institutions are 
not exogenous, nor they derive from the market; institutions co-evolve with other 
endogenous variables (such as values, individual preferences and power relationships) 
and the market is just one institution among others (Hodgson, 2000).  Moreover, 
“markets and other economic institutions do more than allocate goods and services: they 
also influence the evolution of values, tastes, and personalities” (Bowles, 1998: p. 75). 
A perverse effect of the endogenous change of motivations and preferences is that 
altruistic and cooperative attitudes can be “crowded out” by a cultural environment 
biased towards selfish attitudes; policies are affected too, given that individual 
responsibility may be driven away by economic incentives (Bazin et al., 2004; Bowles, 
2008; Frey, 1997). 
Institutional economists deeply and thoroughly criticize the spontaneous order and 
market failure metaphors that are at the heart of orthodox environmental economics 
(Bromley, 1998 and 2007; Gowdy, 2004 and 2005).  In particular, the very weak (if not 
illogical) conceptual foundations of the standard treatment of both environmental 
externalities and internalization policies are stressed (Vatn and Bromley, 1997).  
Starting from Coase's demonstration that externalities are the result of 
 
2 Institutional economics is sometimes called 'old' institutional economics to avoid any confusion with 
'new' institutional economics. Because of its recent revival it is also called 'classical' institutional 
economics or 'alternative' institutional economics. Here we will simply call it 'institutional economics'. 
                                                 
interdependencies that are not compensated in the market because of transaction costs, 
Calabresi (1991) shows that any public intervention aimed at reducing externalities 
and/or transaction costs will give place to redistributive effects3.  This means that the 
Pigouvian distinction between allocative and distributive effects of environmental 
policies is false and that conflicts about environmental resources will not find an 
optimal solution through standard welfare economics (Paavola, 2007). 
Institutional economics is also having a significant influence on two theoretical and 
applied fields of environmental economics: resource regimes and environmental 
evaluation. 
Resource regimes are institutional structures established to regulate access to resources 
and their use; obviously they are very important in the case of local and global natural 
commons (Vatn, 2005: ch. 10).  Institutional economics provides a positive and 
normative approach to resource regimes that goes far beyond the still so influential 
“tragedy of the commons”; indeed, in spite of Hardin's analysis, open access and private 
ownership should not be considered as the only alternative regimes: collective property 
is to be included too, in the form of both common and state property (McCay, 2002; 
Ostrom, 1990)4.  But the re-conceptualization of resource regimes is carried further: 
property entitlement is just one of the many endogenous elements (others being: basic 
values and preferences, powers and interests, transaction costs, etc.) of evolving 
environmental governance solutions (Paavola, 2007).  Arguments in favour of a multi-
level and cooperative institutional setting – able to combine international agreements,  
 
3  In addition, Vatn and Bromley (1997) highlight that externalities are – by definition – the result of 
interdependencies, nevertheless they are used in a theoretical and political framework where it  is 
assumed that agents  behave independently. 
4  Once and for all the community of social scientists should acknowledge what Hardin wrote thirty years 
after his seminal paper: “To judge from the critical literature, the weightiest mistake in my synthesizing 
paper was the omission of the modifying adjective 'unmanaged'. In correcting this omission, one can 
generalize the practical conclusion in this way: A 'managed commons' describes either socialism or the 
privatism of free enterprise. Either one may work; either one may fail: 'The devil is in the details'. But 
with an unmanaged commons, you can forget about the devil: As overuse of resources reduces carrying 
capacity, ruin is inevitable. With this modification firmly in place, 'The Tragedy of the Commons' is well 
tailored for further interdisciplinary syntheses.” (Hardin, 1998: p. 683) 
 
 global communication and citizens’ involvement – are emphasized when looking for an 
effective way of governing global environmental issues (Vatn, 2007). 
Institutional economics considers environmental evaluation as an institution too: a 
“value articulating institution” that is conditioned by the incommensurability of 
conflicting values (Vatn, 2005: ch. 11 and 12).  This is why multidimensional tools 
(such as multi-criteria analysis) should be preferred to monetary ones (such as cost-
benefit analysis). Moreover, deliberation –  i.e.  allowing some form of direct 
participation of citizens, stakeholders and experts – is to be included into the evaluation 
procedure, both to ease the mutual understanding between involved parties and to avoid 
the risk that powerful interests “capture” “black-box” evaluation techniques.  These 
considerations have led to the diffusion of participated multi-criteria procedures, that is, 
using some form of collective deliberation to open up the policy debate, and a multi-
criteria technique to close it  and to arrive at final recommendations (Stagl, 2007).  
Summing up, one should say that institutional economics considers both resource 
regimes and environmental evaluation as institutions which, if well set, may effectively 
manage distributional conflicts about environmental matters, by facilitating collective 
learning and sharing. 
 
2.2. Evolutionary theories of innovation and the environment 
 
Joseph Schumpeter founded his economic theory on the Darwinian metaphor of the 
innovation-driven variation and selection of heterogeneous firms.  Evolutionary theories 
of innovation start from here to elaborate a new conceptualisation of the technology-
economy  relationship that one may roughly summarize in three points (Freeman, 1982; 
Lundvall, 1992; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Silverberg et al., 1988): 1) Technology, 
firms' performances and market structure are all endogenous features of genuinely 
                                                 
dynamic incremental innovation processes. 2) Incremental innovation processes take 
place through a network of relationships involving not only firms, but also other actors, 
such as: research centres, universities, financial institutions, public bodies, etc. 3) 
Cumulative and systemic learning processes are at the heart of technological and 
economic path-dependence and lock-in phenomena; unlocking can take place only as a 
result of radical innovation processes which involve technological and economic 
variables. 
Such a conceptualization is applied to environmental matters too (Kemp and Soete, 
1991; Berkhout, 2002): unsustainable technologies are the result of lock-in in existing 
techno-economical systems5.  The lock-in explanation is considered valid for energy 
(Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006), mobility (Hoogma et al., 2002) and – in a more general 
way – for high-carbon technologies (Unruh, 2002).  New – and more sustainable – 
technologies will only emerge as the result of unlocking: i.e. of a radical shift into a new 
system (Sartorius, 2006).  These considerations have a relevant normative side-effect: 
the standard comparison of environmental policy tools is no longer valid because of its 
static-bias; every tool is to be used if it can ease economically and technologically 
uncertain transition processes from existing to new systems (Kemp, 1997: ch. 12 and 
par. 13.4). 
More generally speaking, environmental policies take the form of innovation policies 
aimed at triggering systemic change and at making it viable: technological and 
economical “niches” must be strategically managed to back the riskier initial steps of 
promising new “green” systems; cumulative technological and economic learning can 
be helped by an appropriate combination of technology-push, demand-pull and 
regulatory policies (Hoogma et al.,  2005); monetary and fiscal policies must create a 
 
5  Techno-economical system and techno-economical regime are synonymous concepts, the former being 
more used in innovation literature and the latter in its applications to environmental matters. The same 
applies to the concepts of socio-technical system and regime. 
                                                 
macro-economic “climate” which is able to sustain those public and private investments 
that are needed to create a new system (Amendola and Gaffard, 1998)6. 
In recent years, different efforts have been made to reconcile institutional economics 
and evolutionary theories of innovation (Geels, 2004; Nelson, 2002; Pelikan, 2003)7. 
Consistently with these contributions, “socio-technical” systems are considered the 
result of dynamic processes in which three structural factors co-evolve: technologies, 
institutions and values (van den Bergh and Stagl, 2003). Such a theoretical integration 
has a relevant impact on environmental economics and policy too (Smith et al., 2005): 
on the technological side, where “socio-technical” transitions must be managed to 
undertake the co-evolution of technical and environmental systems (Kemp and 
Rotmans, 2005); on the institutional side, where resistance to transition towards more 
sustainable technologies increase when suppliers of existing systems dominate public 
agendas (Walker, 2000); and on the environmental side, where a better management of 
natural resources must be “related to adjustments and adaptations that emerge within the 
socio-economic systems in terms of altered institutions, technologies, policies, 
perceptions and behaviours” (Rammel et al., 2007: p. 17). 
Summing up: more sustainable “socio-technical” systems will emerge only with an 
effective management of co-evolutionary processes which involve coherent changes in 





6  It must be stressed that – as in any other evolutionary innovation policy – a trade-off is created between 
“betting” on one single technological option, that could lead to an unprofitable – and irreversible – 
choice, and the simultaneous opening of several niches, that could lead to an excessive dispersion of 
resources.  Such a trade-off can be effectively managed  only trough an adaptive management based on 
in-itinere monitoring of emerging costs and opportunities (Rammel and van den Bergh, 2003) 
7  Actually institutions were already implicit in Freeman's and Lundvall's studies about innovation 
processes and national innovation systems. And it should not be forgotten that Schumpeter himself was 
very much interested in economic institutions (Nelson, 2002). 
                                                 
3. Is heterodox environmental economics already a paradigm? 
 
Yes and no; both answers are valid. From a scientific point of view, heterodox 
environmental economics is already a paradigm; but from the sociological point of view 
it is not one yet. 
One could give an affirmative answer because some common conceptual foundations 
are  shared by all theoretical strands that we considered here. The main reference is to a 
multidimensional systemic approach (instead of market-centred) where three sets of 
endogenous variables (institutions, technologies and values) are explicitly considered to 
understand the existing environment-economy relationships.  Such a co-evolutionary 
approach (instead of static) is used both to explain unsustainability as the result of 
socio-technical path-dependence and lock-in phenomena, and to consider environmental 
policy as the unlocking of existing socio-technical systems and the adaptive 
management of the transition process towards more sustainable ones. The explicit 
consideration of powers and interests, the preference for deliberation (instead of 
evaluation) and the assumption of ethical pluralism (i.e. the coexistence of different 
motivations to act: altruistic and selfish, cooperative and competitive, etc.) are other 
relevant conceptual “bricks” of heterodox environmental economics. 
At the same time, one could give a negative answer because a community of researchers 
defining themselves  ‘heterodox environmental economists’ still does not exist. 
Nevertheless, there are some facts that should be considered to evaluate the social state 
of the art of the heterodox environmental paradigm: 1) The Dutch ‘transition’ school 
and the group of innovation researchers based at the Science and Technology Policy 
Research Unit (SPRU) of the University of Sussex form a stable scientific network8; 2) 
Still the SPRU has attracted some ecological economists too; 3) Many scholars of the 
 
8  See also Kemp’s paper in this Special Issue. 
 Dutch-SPRU network have stable scientific connections with institutional economists 
and with researchers of other disciplines involved with environmental institutional 
matters. Can these facts be considered as the social core of a nascent paradigm? Time 
will tell. 
I only hope that this Special Issue will contribute to establishing heterodox 
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